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Abstract 
Step-parent adoption happens where a child is adopted by the 
spouse or civil union partner of a biological parent. This is a 
drastic invasion into the life of a child because (except if 
provided for otherwise) an adoption order terminates all 
parental responsibilities and rights any person had in respect of 
a child immediately before the adoption, and confers full 
parental responsibilities and rights in respect of the adopted 
child upon the adoptive parent. Under specific circumstances 
an adoption order may also be rescinded, again disrupting the 
life of the child dramatically. Because of the immense impact on 
a child, the rescission of an adoption order has to be handled 
with kid gloves. 
In GT v CT [2015] 3 ALL SA 631 (GJ) two children had been 
legally adopted by their stepfather while the Child Care Act was 
in operation. After the implementation of the Children's Act 38 of 
2005, however, he applied for these adoption orders to be 
rescinded. The court was faced with a situation where the 
application had been brought in contravention of the maximum 
two-year-period as prescribed by the Children's Act. Although it 
was argued that non-compliance with this statutory requirement 
prevented the court from adjudicating this matter, Mokgoatlheng 
J focused on the best interests of the child, considered the 
legality of the adoption orders (why?), and ultimately concluded 
that the supremacy of the best interests of the child meant that 
he was not precluded from hearing the application. In the end 
he ordered the rescission of the adoption orders. The judgment 
cannot be supported. 
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1 Introduction 
There could be a number of reasons why a step-parent wishes to adopt a 
child, including a desire to provide stability to the child, love for the child, 
and love for the biological parent of the child. Williams1 highlights the 
following reasons why a step-parent may adopt: there may be 
considerable hostility and bitterness between the mother and natural 
father, and she may wish to have no more to do with him; the children may 
be emotionally disturbed by visits from their father; the stepfather may 
wish to have the security of an order, not only so that he feels that the 
children "belong" to him, but also because he would then automatically be 
entitled to custody of them should the mother die or become incapacitated; 
the mother and husband may start a new family and wish all the children 
to be integrated into one unit; they may wish the children to be known by 
the husband's surname; it may, quite simply, be very inconvenient to the 
mother and husband for the father to have access to the children. What 
makes step-parent adoption different to other forms of adoption is that 
there is often a biological parent, other than the one married to the step-
parent, who is still involved in the child's life. Such adoption thus leads to 
the termination of an existing relationship, not necessarily for the right 
reasons. For instance, a biological father may agree to a step-parent 
adoption in order to avoid paying maintenance for the child.  
In the matter under discussion a stepfather had adopted the two children 
of his spouse. However, GT v CT2 did not deal with the adoption of the 
children, but with an application for the rescission of the adoption orders. 
This case is extremely important. There is very little authority with regard 
to step-parent adoption since the implementation of the Children's Act,3 
and there is a complete lack of authority when it comes to the rescission of 
adoption orders. In fact, Mokgoatlheng J was quoted as saying that the 
case was the most difficult he had had to hear, and that he had had to 
conduct extensive research.4 
                                            
*  Themba Skosana. LLB (Unisa). Lecturer of Law in the Department of Private Law, 
University of South Africa. Email: skosatm@unisa.ac.za. 
** Sandra Ferreira. BLC LLB (UP) LLD (Unisa). Associate Professor of Law in the 
Department of Private Law, University of South Africa. Email: ferres@unisa.ac.za. 
1  Williams 1982 U Tor LJ 214. 
2  GT v CT 2015 3 All SA 631 (GJ) – hereafter GT v CT. 
3  Children's Act 38 of 2005. Recently Centre for Child Law v Minister of Social 
Development 2014 1 SA 468 (GNP) was heard. This matter dealt with the 
requirements relating to a child who is adoptable. Also see Ferreira 2015 THRHR 
148. 
4  Mokati 2015 http://bit.ly/1MV06F6. 
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2 The case 
2.1 Facts 
The first and second respondents (the children's biological mother and 
father respectively)5 were married. When they divorced in 2005 they had a 
son, E. At the time of the divorce the mother was expecting their daughter, 
I. Upon the divorce the mother was awarded care (previously custody) of 
both children. The applicant6 and the mother met whilst the latter was 
pregnant with I, and they got married in 2006. In 2007 the stepfather 
adopted both children with the consent of both the mother and the 
biological father. The biological father continued to have contact with and 
also paid maintenance in respect of E, who still regarded him as his father. 
With regard to I, who regarded her stepfather as her father and had 
emotionally bonded with him, the biological father did not exercise contact. 
The stepfather and the mother divorced in 2008. The mother was awarded 
the care of children.  
The stepfather alleged that the mother had not allowed him to exercise his 
parental responsibilities and rights towards the children during the 
subsistence of their marriage and after the divorce. She had undermined 
him, had made all the decisions and, after their separation and later their 
divorce, she had prevented him from having contact with the children. He 
further alleged that she had told him that he could not exercise any 
parental rights, obligations and responsibilities over the children without 
her consent as he was not their biological father, and that the biological 
father enjoyed precedence7 over him regarding the children's social and 
educational lives.8  
After the divorce, the first and second respondents enjoyed the benefit of 
the parental relationship with the children but left the financial obligations 
in respect of their welfare and maintenance to the stepfather.9 The 
stepfather thus ceased to have any meaningful physical contact with them 
after his separation from the mother. He no longer wished to have any 
physical or emotional contact or a parent-child relationship with the 
children and believed that it would be in the best interests of the children if 
the adoption orders were rescinded. As a result he instituted an 
                                            
5  Hereafter referred to as "mother" and "biological father". 
6  Hereafter referred to as "stepfather". 
7  The parental responsibilities and rights of the biological father in fact no longer 
existed after the adoptions by the stepfather – also see Sonnekus 2015 TSAR 892. 
8  GT v CT paras [23]-[28]. 
9  GT v CT para [29]. 
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application for the rescission of the adoption orders in 2013, more than six 
years after the adoption orders had been handed down. 
The mother and the biological father did not oppose the application for 
rescission, but the third respondent, the Registrar of Adoptions,10 did. The 
Registrar objected on several grounds. The application had been instituted 
six years after the adoptions had been granted - long after the expiry of 
the prescription period for rescission in section 243(2) of the Children's 
Act.11 The Registrar further argued that the stepfather, who still loved the 
children and remained a father figure to them until December 2012,12 
seemed to be motivated in his application by his unwillingness to continue 
paying maintenance, but that it was impermissible for the stepfather to 
sever "his adoptive parental responsibilities"13 because of financial 
considerations.14 The Registrar also averred that the setting aside of the 
adoption orders would not be in the best interests of the children, who still 
regarded the stepfather as their father, and that the court had a 
constitutional obligation to protect the children's best interests.15 
2.2 Judgment 
The first issue that Mokgoatlheng J had to consider was that the 
application had been instituted in contravention of section 243(2) of the 
Children's Act, as the prescribed period of two years within which to lodge 
an application for the rescission of an adoption had long passed. The 
question was thus whether the court had jurisdiction to entertain this 
application at all, and the judge held that the Constitution of the Republic 
of South Africa16 must prevail over the provisions of section 243(2) of the 
Act.17 He stated that the court had to take into account the paramountcy of 
                                            
10  Hereafter referred to as "the Registrar". 
11  GT v CT para [4]. Although the Child Care Act 74 of 1983 was in operation at the 
time of the adoptions, it was subsequently repealed by the Children's Act. In terms of 
s 243(2) of the Children's Act an application for rescission has to be lodged within a 
reasonable time but not exceeding two years from the date of the adoption. 
12  GT v CT para [32]. 
13  The words chosen for this statement give the impression that the relationship 
between a child and an adoptive parent is different from that of a child and a 
biological parent. The point has to be made that there is no difference when it comes 
to parental responsibilities and rights between a biological parent and an adoptive 
parent.  
14  GT v CT paras [32]-[33]. 
15  GT v CT para [34]. 
16  Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. Hereafter "Constitution". 
17  GT v CT paras [15]-[18]. S 243(2), which contains the time frame for an application 
for the rescission of an adoption order, will be discussed under "3.2 Best interests of 
the children" below. 
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the best interests of the children,18 even if intervention by the court meant 
that the court acted in conflict with a statute.19 Mokgoatlheng J gave quite 
a detailed outline of why the adoption of the children had in fact not been 
legal.20 He also came to the conclusion that the biological father had never 
relinquished his parental responsibilities, rights and obligations in respect 
of E.21  
The Family Advocate was requested to interview the parties and to 
compile a report regarding the effect, if any, the rescission of the adoption 
orders would have on the children. The Family Advocate's finding was that 
the rescission would not have "any permanent deleterious psychological 
and emotional effect" on the children, but that it would merely give legal 
effect to the de facto situation that had existed since the stepfather and the 
mother separated.22  
The court concluded that the relationship between the stepfather and the 
children had broken down irretrievably23 and indicated that the stepfather 
was not interested in rebuilding the bond between him and the children.24 
It further held that the biological father enjoyed a normal parent-child 
relationship with both children25 and that the mother and biological father 
should be afforded the opportunity to strengthen their already existing 
parent-child relationship.26 Consequently, it was ordered that the adoption 
orders (of E and I) granted on 26 June 2007 in favour of the applicant by 
the Children's Court are rescinded and set aside with effect from 23 April 
2015.27 
                                            
18  Section 28(2) of the Constitution. 
19  GT v CT paras [8], [13], [14].  
20  He calls it a circumstantial fictional adoption (GT v CT para [43]) and a purported 
adoption (para [46]). 
21  GT v CT para [48]. There are of course two children to consider. 
22  GT v CT para [55]. 
23  GT v CT para [57]. It is disturbing that the court used terminology that is reminiscent 
of divorce proceedings. You cannot divorce your children.  
24  GT v CT para [60]. 
25  GT v CT para [59]. Although this seemed to be true of the relationship between the 
biological father and E, it certainly was not the case with I, who loved her stepfather 
and regarded him as her father. In fact, her biological father did not "exercise 
contact" with her – para [22]. 
26  GT v CT para [61]. 
27  GT v CT para [62[a]]. Subsequent to this decision, the Registrar of Adoptions 
unsuccessfully approached the Supreme Court of Appeal and the Constitutional 
court for permission to appeal the judgment – Wagner 2016 http://bit.ly/1renMu8. 
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3 Evaluation28 
3.1 Introduction 
The Child Care Act29 regulated adoption in South Africa from 1 February 
1987 until 1 April 2010, when the provisions of the Children's Act, which 
currently regulates all aspects related to adoption, came into effect. Before 
considering the judgment any further, there are a few general remarks that 
need to be made, and inaccuracies and misinterpretations that need to be 
pointed out. These will be explored in the discussion that follows: 
 Mokgoatlheng J, who was also the presiding judge in Maneli v Maneli, 
another adoption matter that was severely criticised, delivered the 
judgment.30  
 The court at times cited incorrect legislation.31  
 The court at times referred to the parties incorrectly.32 
 The court used outdated terminology.33  
 Mokgoatlheng J often contradicted himself.34 
                                            
28  Also see Sonnekus 2015 TSAR 886 for a discussion of this case. His views will be 
referred to where relevant. 
29  Child Care Act 74 of 1983. 
30  Maneli v Maneli 2010 7 BCLR 703 (GSJ) – hereafter "Maneli", which dealt with 
customary adoption. Many of the criticisms lodged against the present matter were 
also to be found in Maneli. See Heaton 2010 Ann Surv S African L 453-459.  
31  The rescission order was quite correctly sought in terms of s 243(1)(c) of the 
Children's Act, which is currently in force. However, the Children's Act does not 
apply retrospectively and the court's application of the Children's Act to determine 
the legality of the adoption itself is faulty. The legislation in operation at the time was 
the Child Care Act. The court, however, referred to the (il)legality of the adoptions by 
relying on the Children's Act. Mokgoatlheng J on several occasions referred to the 
supremacy of the Constitution as provided for in s 2, but his reference to the "section 
2 constitutional principle of the supremacy of the principle of the best interests of the 
children in every matter concerning children" (GT v CT para [18]) is incorrect. The 
court indicated that it is "empowered by section 7 of the [Children's] Act to adjudicate 
this matter pursuant to the constitutional imperative of the principle of the children's 
best interests" (para [14]), while s 9 in fact provides for the paramountcy of the best 
interests of the child. S 7 contains the list of factors that must be taken into 
consideration when the best interests of the child standard is applied. See para [40]; 
also see Heaton 2010 Ann Surv S African L 457 for similar criticism of the judgment 
in Maneli. 
32  In GT v CT para [22] the first respondent is referred to as the second applicant, and 
in para [43] she is called the first applicant. 
33  The term "parental authority" has been replaced by "parental responsibilities and 
rights", but on more than one occasion the court still referred to "parental authority" 
(GT v CT paras [25], [27]). Similarly, Mokgoatlheng J also referred to the custody, 
instead of the care, of the children (paras [19], [21], [53], [61]).  
34  With regard to the validity of the first divorce of the mother – see GT v CT paras [29], 
[53]; with regard to the relationship between the children and stepfather, see paras 
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 The court made incorrect assumptions.35 
 The court's conclusion with regard to the effect of the adoption of the 
children on the parental responsibilities and rights of the mother are 
astounding: 
At the time of the divorce the first respondent although she was 
the biological mother of [E] and [I], she was no longer their legal 
guardian because after their adoption by the applicant pursuant to 
section 242(2)(a) the full parental responsibilities and rights in 
respect of the children were conferred upon the applicant. Further 
the parental responsibilities and rights and claims to contact by the 
first and second respondent to the adopted children were 
terminated upon adoption pursuant to section 242(1)(a)(b) and (c) 
of the [Children's] Act.36 
3.2 Best interests of the children 
3.2.1 Introduction 
The standard of the best interests of a child is a constitutional imperative.37 
The child's best interests are of paramount importance38 in every matter 
concerning the child. What would be in the best interests of a child in a 
particular case is not easily determined. It would depend on the 
circumstances of that case, and has to be determined for each case 
individually.39 These interests are a contentious issue that will be debated 
as long as decisions about children have to be taken. Ultimately, the court 
is called upon to make a value judgement to determine what is in the best 
                                                                                                                       
[43], [58], [59]; with regard to the limitation or not of the best interests of the children, 
see paras [15], [36].  
35  With regard to parental responsibilities and rights, see GT v CT paras [25], [28], [45], 
[48], [52].  
36  GT v CT para [52]. Several aspects of this paragraph need further exploration: the 
mother never stopped being the legal guardian of the children; the adoption was not 
granted in terms of s 242(2)(a) of the Children's Act; and s 242(1)(a)(b) and (c) of the 
Children's Act did not terminate the parental responsibilities and rights of the mother. 
The court indicated that the "legality of the divorce decree settlement agreement 
awarding custody of [E] and [I] to the first respondent is legally untenable" (para [53]) 
and that custody could not have been awarded to the mother (paras [21], [53]). This 
interpretation by the court is mindboggling. When a child (or children) is adopted by 
a stepfather who is married to the mother, she does not lose her parental authority 
and rights over that child, either in terms of the Child Care Act – in terms of which 
the adoptions were granted - or the Children's Act. 
37  Section 28(2) of the Constitution. 
38  In Fletcher v Fletcher 1948 1 SA 130 (A) the Appellate Division first gave 
paramountcy to the standard of the best interests of the child. 
39  Davel and de Kock 2001 De Jure 274.  
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interests of the child, bearing all relevant considerations in mind.40 This is 
the "golden thread" enshrined in section 28(2) of the Constitution, which 
runs through the fabric of our law relating to children.41 
Before the implementation of the Children's Act, there was no statutory 
recognition of any factors that need to be taken into account when 
determining the best interests of a child,42 which made it very difficult to 
determine these interests. This lacuna was criticised, as the subjective 
opinions of decision makers could get in the way of objective judgment.43 
Once the Children's Act came into operation, the best interests of the child 
received further protection. The best interests of the child are now 
protected not only by section 28(2) of the Constitution, but also by section 
9 (read with section 7) of the Children's Act. In terms of section 9 the 
standard that a child's best interest is of paramount importance in all 
matters concerning the care, protection and well-being of a child must be 
applied. Whenever this standard is applied, the list of factors in section 7 
must now be taken into consideration where relevant. 
3.2.2 Application 
In his judgment Mokgoatlheng J emphasised the importance of the best 
interests of the child, but his interpretation thereof is flawed. When 
deciding on the role that the best interests of the children have to play, the 
judge focused on section 28(2) of the Constitution,44 and hardly 
considered sections 7 and 9 of the Children's Act. Mokgoatlheng J 
mentioned section 9 only once, and only in reference to other cases where 
the best interests of children were at issue.45 As for section 7,46 the court 
in passing mentioned some of the factors that must be considered,47 but 
there is no evidence that any of these factors were ever considered.48 
Factors that should have been considered include (but are not limited to) 
                                            
40  This is what the court held in P v P 2007 5 SA 94 (SCA) para [14]. In K v M 2007 4 
All SA 883 (E) 891 judge Leach held that all relevant factors have to be taken into 
account to prevent a warped picture of what is in the child's best interest. 
41  Petersen v Maintenance Officer 2004 1 All SA 117 (C) 124. 
42  The court in 1994 in McCall v McCall 1994 3 SA 201 (C) 204-205 made a list of 
some of the most important factors that have to be taken into account and which 
serve as a guide to determine the best interests of a child. 
43  Boezaart "General Principles" 2-8. 
44  See GT v CT paras [36] – [38], [40]. 
45  GT v CT para [40]. 
46  Mention was made of this section only in GT v CT paras [14] (clearly the intention 
here was to refer to s 9), [36], [39], [40]. 
47  GT v CT para [39]. 
48  Not even in the request to the Family Advocate (see GT v CT para [3]) to compile a 
report was the list of factors mentioned. 
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the personal relationship between the stepfather and the children,49 the 
capacity of the stepfather to provide for the needs of the children,50 the 
likely effect on the children of any change in their circumstances,51 and the 
children's age, maturity and stage of development.52  
Furthermore, the judge failed to take into consideration the fact that there 
were two children, who had very different relationships with their 
stepfather53 and whose best interests when it came to the rescission of the 
adoption orders seem to have been very different. 
3.2.3 Rescission 
An adoption order may be rescinded in terms of section 243 of the 
Children's Act, provided that the requirements in this section are met. The 
first of these requirements54 is that the rescission of the order has to be in 
the best interests of the child. It was therefore pertinent to consider the 
best interests of E and I before anything else. This deserves further 
exploration. Even if the court's interpretation of the application of the best 
interests of the child standard, namely that it is absolute, is accepted, the 
facts do not support its contention that the rescission of the adoption 
orders would be in the best interests of the children. How did the court 
determine what these best interests are? There is no evidence that the 
children themselves were ever consulted with regard to their best 
interests.55 The court relied on the evidence presented by the adults, all of 
whom had different agendas and requested the rescission for reasons that 
do not support the best interests of the children. The Family Advocate and 
Family Counsellor in their findings indicated that the rescission of the 
adoption orders would "not have any permanent deleterious psychological 
and emotional effect" on E and I.56 This may be true, but that is not the 
same as the rescission's being in the best interests of the children. 
Although it seems that there was a strong bond between the biological 
father and E,57 there are also numerous references to the bond between 
the stepfather and the children, especially I,58 and the Registrar pointed 
                                            
49  Section 7(1)(a) of the Children's Act. It is clear that at least I had a very good 
relationship with her stepfather – GT v CT paras [22], [43].  
50  Section 7(1)(c) of the Children's Act. 
51  Section 7(1)(d) of the Children's Act. 
52  Section 7(1)(g)(i) of the Children's Act. 
53  GT v CT paras [22], [43], [48]. 
54  Section 243(3)(a) of the Children's Act. 
55  This will be discussed in more detail under "3.5 The voice of the child" below. 
56  GT v CT para [55]. 
57  GT v CT para [48]. 
58  GT v CT paras [22], [43]. 
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out that rescission would not be in the best interests of the children, as 
they had bonded with the applicant, whom they still regarded as their 
father.59 
Besides the best interests of the children, section 243(2) also contains two 
further requirements before an adoption order may be rescinded, one of 
which has to be met before the adoption order may be rescinded. 
Mokgoatlheng J held that, although a court cannot generally exercise its 
jurisdiction in conflict with a statute, it is enjoined to take into account the 
paramountcy of the best interests of the child,60 and where there is an 
apparent conflict between the provisions of sections of the Children's Act 
and the Constitution, it (the court) has to intervene.61 The judge expressed 
the opinion that sections 2,62 28(1)63 and 28(2) of the Constitution "trump 
the prescriptive peremptory injunction of section 243(2) of the Act",64 and 
that these provisions in the Constitution must prevail over the provisions of 
the Children's Act. The fact of the matter is that adoption is regulated by 
the Children's Act, not by the Constitution. This is thus incorrect and 
contrary to his own declaration65 that the application of the relevant 
sections involves "the weighing up of various competing interests and 
rights, and at times the limitation of the children's best interests". Although 
legislation may of course be declared unconstitutional and thus repealed 
under specific circumstances, this does not give the court carte blanche to 
decide to ignore existing legislation.66 The court ignored section 39(2) of 
the Constitution, which provides that, when interpreting any legislation and 
when developing the common law or customary law, every court, tribunal 
or forum must promote the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights.67 
The best interests of the child as provided for in section 28(2) are 
paramount, but they are not absolute.68 The child's best interests are more 
                                            
59  GT v CT para [34]. 
60  GT v CT para [8]. 
61  GT v CT para [9]. 
62  This section confirms the supremacy of the Constitution. 
63  The right of a child to family care or parental care, or to appropriate alternative care 
when removed from the family environment. 
64  GT v CT para [14].  
65  See GT v CT para [36]. 
66  Legislation may be declared unconstitutional if it violates a fundamental right in the 
Bill of Rights, or if it is in conflict with a constitutional requirement – s 172 of the 
Constitution. See Sonnekus 2015 TSAR 899. Also see GT v CT paras [15] - [17]. 
67  Also see Investigating Directorate: Serious Economic Offences v Hyundai Motor 
Distributors: In re Hyundai Motor Distributors (Pty) Ltd v Smit 2001 1 SA 545 (CC) 
para [21]; Botha Statutory Interpretation 183. 
68  Minister of Welfare and Population Development v Fitzpatrick 2000 3 SA 422 (CC) 
429; De Reuck v Director of Public Prosecutions, Witwatersrand Local Division 2004 
1 SA 406 (CC) 432; M v S 2007 12 BCLR 1312 (CC) para [25]; Skelton 
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important than anything else, but everything else is not unimportant.69 The 
best interests of the child can be limited in terms of section 36 of the 
Constitution.70 To assume that they would trump all other rights and 
interests would be unpalatable,71 as it would then become pointless to 
even consider the rights and interests of other parties,72 or other 
legislation.  
3.3 Validity and effect of the adoptions 
3.3.1 Validity of the adoptions 
Something the court paid much (unnecessary) attention to was the validity 
of the adoptions. There was never any allegation or evidence that the 
adoptions were not legal. Almost a quarter of the judgment was dedicated 
to this aspect. Mokgoatlheng J's conclusions in this regard are not only 
unnecessary but incorrect. He firstly based his argument with regard to the 
validity of the adoption orders on the provisions of the Children's Act,73 and 
secondly he deduced that the first respondent lost her parental 
responsibilities and rights when the adoption orders were granted.74 
The adoptions had been granted years before, when the Child Care Act 
was in operation.75 Once the adoption orders had been granted the 
children were for all purposes regarded as the children of the adoptive 
parents and vice versa.76 The only ways77 in which these adoption orders 
                                                                                                                       
"Constitutional and International Protection of Children's Rights" 282-283. 
Mokgoatlheng J acknowledged this himself in GT v CT para [8] where he said that 
the court "is enjoined to take into account the paramountcy of the best interests of 
the children" (my emphasis) and in para [36] where he said that "[t]he fact that the 
best interests of the child are paramount does not imply that the child's best interest 
right is absolute". He further said in para [35] that in weighing up the children's best 
interests in adoption matters, "the court is obliged to consider the effect the 
rescission of the adoption orders will have on the children, especially where a 
considerable period of time has elapsed since the granting of such adoption orders 
and the children have formed a bond with their adoptive parent". 
69  Centre for Child Law v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development 2009 2 
SACR 477 (CC) para [29]. 
70  Also see Minister of Welfare and Population Development v Fitzpatrick 2000 3 SA 
422 (CC) 429; and De Reuck v Director of Public Prosecutions, Witwatersrand Local 
Division 2004 1 SA 406 (CC) 432. 
71  Bonthuys 2006 Int J Law Policy Family 23. 
72  Bonthuys 2006 Int J Law Policy Family 34. 
73  GT v CT paras [44]-[45], [47]-[50], [52]. 
74  GT v CT para [46]. 
75  The Child Care Act was repealed by schedule 4 of the Children's Act on 1 April 
2010. 
76  Section 20(2) of the Child Care Act. Although the Child Care Act was later repealed 
by the Children's Act, this does not have retrospective effect. 
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(together with the legal relationship between the children and the parents) 
could have been set aside was through rescission,78 an appeal to the 
competent division of the Supreme Court,79 or a subsequent adoption.80  
In his discussion of the validity of the adoptions, Mokgoatlheng J 
incorrectly relied on the provisions of the Children's Act.81 The Children's 
Act does not have retrospective effect,82 and the legality and effect of the 
adoptions were thus determined by section 20(1) of the Child Care Act, 
not by the provisions of the Children's Act as assumed by the judge.83 The 
court alluded to the "purported legality of the award",84 the "legal fiction 
regarding … the legality of the efficacy of the de jure adoption", asked 
whether there was "a bona fide adoption … predicated on section 
239(1)(a) of the [Children's] Act",85 and referred to the adoptions by the 
court as "forged on an unsound legal and moral foundation",86 an "abstract 
circumstantial fictional adoption",87 a "legal fiction",88 an "apparent 
adoption"89 and a "purported adoption".90 These inferences are 
astounding, to say the least, and after deducing that there were no proper 
adoptions to be rescinded, the court then in its order sets aside the 
adoptions. Because of the irrelevance with regard to the order made, the 
serious mistake made by the court regarding the legality of the adoptions 
will not be explored any further.  
3.3.2 Effect of adoptions 
A critical error made by Mokgoatlheng J was his interpretation of section 
242(1)(a) of the Children's Act,91 which deals with the effect of an adoption 
                                                                                                                       
77  Review was never an option, as an application for review is based on irregularities in 
court proceedings, which was never alleged in this matter.  
78  Section 21 of the Child Care Act; s 243 of the Children's Act. 
79  Section 22 of the Child Care Act; s 51 of the Children's Act. 
80  Section 23 of the Child Care Act; s 230(3) of the Children's Act. 
81  GT v CT paras [49] -50]. 
82  Malcolm v Premier, Western Cape Government 2014 3 SA 177 (SCA) para [23]; 
Minister of Public Works v Haffejee 1996 3 SA 745 (SCA) 753B-C; Shange v MEC 
for Education, Kwazulu-Natal 2012 2 SA 519 (KZD) para [31]; Heaton "South African 
Law of Persons" 112; Boezaart 2008 De Jure 245. 
83  GT v CT paras [21], [50], [52]. 
84  GT v CT para [21]. 
85  GT v CT para [44]. 
86  GT v CT para [42]. 
87  GT v CT para [43]. 
88  GT v CT paras [44]-[46]. 
89  GT v CT para [45]. 
90  GT v CT para [46]. 
91  Section 242(1) of the Children's Act: Except when provided otherwise in the order or 
in a post-adoption agreement confirmed by the court an adoption order terminates – 
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order, namely that all parental responsibilities and rights of both biological 
parents are terminated upon adoption.92 The court deduced that the 
mother lost her parental responsibilities and rights when the children were 
adopted by their stepfather.93 In terms of section 20(1) of the Child Care 
Act the rights and obligations which existed between a child and any 
person who was his or her parent immediately before an adoption were 
terminated by the adoption, except in the case of a step-parent adoption.94 
The mother obviously did not lose her parental responsibilities and rights. 
The court's interpretation that she lost her parental responsibilities and 
rights when the children were adopted by their stepfather95 and its 
assumptions of the "purported legality of the award of the custody … to 
the [mother being] in conflict with the adoption orders"96 as well as the 
"purported adoption" by the stepfather being a "legal fiction" because 
"although [the mother] had consented to the adoption of [E] and [I] by the 
applicant, de facto she never relinquished her parental rights, obligations 
and responsibilities and 'legal guardianship' as the biological mother"97 
are thus completely wrong. This is so even if one accepted the court's 
faulty application of the provisions of the Children's Act to the effect of 
the adoptions, as the preamble of section 242(1), in terms of which an 
adoption order terminates all parental responsibilities and rights that any 
person had before an adoption contains an exception to this rule. This 
exception affords a discretion to the court to order that the usual 
consequences of an adoption order would not apply, including that a step-
parent adoption would automatically terminate all parental responsibilities 
and rights of the parent to whom the step-parent was married.98  
                                                                                                                       
(a) all parental responsibilities and rights any person, including a parent, step-parent 
or partner in a domestic life partnership, had in respect of the child immediately 
before the adoption;" 
92  GT v CT paras [44]-[45]. 
93  GT v CT paras [45]-[47], [52]. 
94  Section 20(1) read with s 17(c) of the Child Care Act. The spouse of the parent of 
the child is an exception to the fact that "[a]n order of adoption shall terminate all 
the rights and obligations existing between the child and any person who was his 
parent … immediately prior to such adoption". 
95  GT v CT paras [21] and [52], [54]. 
96  GT v CT para [21]. 
97  GT v CT para [46]. 
98  Also see Centre for Child Law v Minister of Social Development 2014 1 SA 468 
(GNP) para [14], where it was held that s 242 did not automatically terminate all 
parental responsibilities and rights of the guardian of a child when an adoption order 
was granted in favour of the spouse of the guardian. 
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3.4 Court's competence to consider rescission 
3.4.1 Prescribed period  
The adoptions had been granted in 2007, and the application for 
rescission was instituted in terms of section 243 of the Children's Act six 
years later, whereas an application for the rescission of an adoption order 
must be lodged within a reasonable time but not exceeding two years from 
the date of the adoption.99 It is important to distinguish between a situation 
where the court has a discretion, such as whether or not the facts support 
the rescission of an adoption order, and a situation such as this one, 
where there is no discretion – the prescribed period has lapsed. Clearly 
the application should not have been entertained at all. There are several 
aspects of the court's interpretation of section 243 that deserve further 
consideration.  
Counsel for the Registrar pointed out that the provisions of section 243(2) 
of the Children's Act prevented the court from considering an application 
for the rescission of the adoption orders,100 as the prescribed maximum 
period of two years had lapsed long before. The Registrar also argued that 
"the court [cannot] exercise its inherent power in conflict with a statute"101 
and if the court granted the rescission, it would be "usurping the role and 
power of the Legislature in contravention of the constitutional principle of 
the separation of powers".102 In Radebe v Government of the Republic of 
South Africa it was held that unreasonable delay may cause prejudice to 
some parties and that it is both desirable and important that finality should 
be reached within a reasonable time in respect of judicial and 
administrative decisions.103 Once the prescribed period to apply for the 
rescission of an adoption order had lapsed, the matter should not have 
been considered. The court referred to Belo v Commissioner of Child 
Welfare, Johannesburg: Belo v Chapelle,104 in which the biological father's 
consent to an adoption had not been obtained before the adoption was 
granted. It was held that a delay of seven years in noting an appeal was 
                                            
99  Section 243(2) of the Children's Act. 
100  GT v CT para [4]. 
101  GT v CT para [5]. 
102  GT v CT para [6]. 
103  Radebe v Government of the Republic of South Africa 1995 3 SA 787 (D) 798(C). 
104  Belo v Commissioner of Child Welfare, Johannesburg 2002 3 All SA 286 (W), 
hereafter referred to as "Belo". In this matter seven years had passed before an 
application for the late noting of an appeal. The court held that the application was 
launched within a reasonable time of the applicant becoming aware of the adoption 
(para [23]), but that it would not be reasonable to interfere with the adoption order 
after such a long period – para [30]. 
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so long that it would not be in the best interests of the child to interfere 
with the adoption order. Mokgoatlheng J then indicated that the facts in the 
present matter were different from those in Belo, without pointing out these 
differences or discussing them in any way. It is true that there are several 
differences between the cases, but none of these differences could lead 
the court in this matter to believe that it could come to the decision it 
did.105 
There are ways other than rescission that may be employed to set aside 
the adoption orders, and the parties should have been advised to pursue 
these options.106  
3.4.2 Requirements 
In terms of section 243(3) an adoption order may be rescinded only if the 
rescission is in the best interests of the child107 and one of two further 
requirements is present – either the applicant is a parent of the child 
whose consent was required for the adoption order to be made, but whose 
consent was not obtained,108 or at the time of making the adoption order 
the adoptive parent did not qualify as such in terms of section 231.109 The 
first (but not the only) requirement that has to be met before an adoption 
order may be rescinded is that rescission of the order has to be in the best 
interests of the child.110 The court focused on this requirement and did not 
at any stage acknowledge that there are also two further requirements that 
have to be considered, one of which has to be present before the 
rescission of an adoption order is possible. It simply focused on the best 
interests of the child and treated this first requirement as the only one that 
                                            
105  In Belo the biological father did not consent to the adoption of his daughter, and the 
court held that the consent of the father could not have ben dispensed with. The 
father lodged an appeal in terms of s 22(1) of the Child Care Act, but his application 
for late noting of the appeal was dismissed. The only noteworthy difference seems to 
be that the mother and the stepfather opposed the application by the biological 
father, whereas all the parents (the mother, the biological father and the stepfather) 
in this matter wanted the adoption orders rescinded. The court referred to the need 
for finality in litigation, which is expressed in the maxim interest rei publicae ut sit 
finis litium – paras [23]-[24]. 
106  Although an application for the review of the adoption proceedings does not seem to 
have been an option, an appeal against the order could have been lodged to the 
High Court in terms of s 51 of the Children's Act, or, as a last resort, an application 
for the adoption of a previously adopted child could have been submitted – see Louw 
2010 De Jure 335-336.  
107  Section 243(3)(a) of the Children's Act. 
108  Section 243(3)(b) of the Children's Act. 
109  Section 243(3)(c) of the Children's Act. 
110  Section 243(3)(a) of the Children's Act. This is discussed under "3.2 Best interests of 
the children" above. 
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needed to be complied with. The impression is created that the court had 
made the decision that the rescission had to happen and then went about 
finding a way to make it a reality.  
The problem is that the matter is certainly not that simple. The best 
interests of children cannot and do not trump everything else and all other 
legislation.111 As already mentioned, relying on the best interest of the 
child does not pave the way for ignoring existing legislation. There are two 
further requirements, and one of these has to be complied with before an 
application for rescission can be considered, let alone granted. Subsection 
(b)112 is not relevant to the facts, which leaves only (c)113 as an option to 
be considered, but the stepfather did qualify at the time of making the 
adoption orders as an adoptive parent in terms of section 231(1)(c) of the 
Children's Act.114 The requirements for rescission in section 243(3) had 
therefore not been complied with, further strengthening the view that this 
application should never have been considered in the first place.115 
3.5 The voice of the child 
Over the past few years, there has been growing recognition of the 
autonomy of children and their right to have a say in matters affecting their 
well-being.116 This is an area of South African law that has received much 
attention.117 Very little attention has, however, been given to child 
participation in the adoption process.118 Section 10 of the Children's Act,119 
                                            
111  See "3.2 Best interests of the children" above. 
112  Section 243(3)(b) of the Children's Act: the applicant is a parent of the child whose 
consent was required for the adoption order to be made, but whose consent was not 
obtained. 
113  Section 243(3)(c) of the Children's Act: at the time of making the adoption order the 
adoptive parent did not qualify as such in terms of s 231. 
114  Section 231(1) of the Children's Act: "A child may be adopted—(c) by a married 
person whose spouse is the parent of the child or by a person whose permanent 
domestic life-partner is the parent of the child." 
115  Counsel for the Registrar also argued that the stepfather had failed to comply with 
these requirements and that the application had to be dismissed - GT v CT para [7]. 
116  This is clear from decisions such as French v French 1971 4 SA 298 (W); Manning v 
Manning 1975 4 SA 659 (T); and Märtens v Märtens 1991 4 SA 287 (T). Children 
must be given the opportunity to express their views in relation to a decision which 
will affect them - Du Toit "Legal Representation of Children" 95. Also see Sloth-
Nielsen 1995 SAJHR 403. 
117  Barrie 2013 TSAR 124; Du Toit "Legal Representation of Children" 93; Sloth-Nielsen 
2008 SAJHR 495.  
118  Ferreira 2014 THRHR 375. 
119  Section 10 of the Children's Act: "Every child that is of such an age, maturity and 
stage of development as to be able to participate in any matter concerning that child 
has the right to participate in an appropriate way and views expressed by the child 
must be given due consideration." 
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which incorporates the provisions of article 12(1) of the United Nations 
Convention on the Rights of the Child into South Africa's domestic law, 
thereby complying with South Africa's obligations in that regard,120 
provides that every child who is of such an age, maturity and stage of 
development121 as to be able to participate in any matter concerning that 
child has the right to participate in an appropriate way and views 
expressed by the child must be given due consideration.122  
There is no specific provision for child participation when it comes to 
adoption or the rescission of an adoption order,123 but the rescission of an 
adoption order is most definitely a "matter concerning [the] child" and thus, 
in terms of section 10, E and I had a right to participate in this process and 
their views had to be given due consideration. Although the court 
requested the Family Advocate to interview all the relevant parties 
(including the children) and to compile a report, the instruction was not to 
interview the children or to consider their views in any way, but to indicate 
what effect, if any, rescission of the adoption orders would have on the 
children and to incorporate these into her findings and recommendations, 
taking into account the best interests of the children.124 There is no excuse 
for not hearing the children and their perspectives in this matter. 
4 Conclusion 
Had there been a statutory requirement for the counselling of the parents 
by the adoptions social worker facilitating the adoptions before they were 
granted, the adoption might never have happened in the first place.125 
                                            
120  Boezaart "General Principles" 2-16. 
121  In terms of s 7 of the Children's Act the age, maturity and stage of development of 
the children are also factors that have to be considered. There is no indication that 
any of these aspects were considered, making it impossible to say whether they 
were mature and/or developed enough to participate, and although their ages are 
not given, E and I were both born from the mother's first marriage, which ended in 
2005 (E being the elder child), making E older than 10 years at the time of the 
application for rescission, and I very close to, if not over 10 years of age. 
122  In SALC Review of the Child Care Act 143-144 was of the opinion that the views of 
the child, where a child has the ability to express such views, must always be 
considered. Barrie 2013 TSAR 137 is of the view that it may be necessary for the 
South African legislature to elaborate on s 10 and spell out what is meant by 
"appropriate" participation and how to give "due consideration" to the views of the 
child in family law proceedings.  
123  In terms of s 243(1)(c) of the Children's Act a child may now apply for an adoption to 
be rescinded, but there is no provision for child participation if the application is 
made by someone other than the child. 
124  GT v CT para [3].  
125  The mother especially could have benefited from counselling - GT v CT paras [23]-
[28], [45], [58]. 
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Unfortunately at the time there was no such requirement.126 The 
impression left by this judgment is that there was some kind of collusion or 
scheming against the stepfather when the adoptions were granted and 
that the court looked for a way to "right this wrong". Even if this was so and 
it was true that the adoptions had been "forged on an unsound legal and 
moral foundation"127 and had been "engineered by the first respondent 
with the connivance of the second respondent and the compliance of the 
applicant"128 it has no bearing on the matter, as the mind-set of the parties, 
or the driving force behind the applications, is not relevant or a factor for 
the rescission of an adoption order.129 The requirements for the rescission 
of an adoption order are objective and not in any way influenced by the 
purpose or reason for the application.  
Unfortunately the facts show that the relationships between the stepfather 
and the children may not have been good at the time of the application for 
rescission (from both the perspective of the children and the stepfather),130 
but the stepfather still seemed to love the children131 and the children 
him.132 In any parent/child relationship there will be times when the 
relationship goes through a bad patch, but it is not possible to "divorce" 
your children.133 Therapy and/or the counselling of all the parties involved 
might have been the appropriate way to deal with the problems in the 
relationships. Be that as it may, the reality is that the adoption orders 
should not have been rescinded.  
A final general remark needs to be made. Step-parent adoption could be a 
wonderful experience and provide a child with the love, support and family 
life every child deserves.134 Unfortunately, as already suggested, it often 
takes place for the wrong reasons.135 It was reported after the judgment 
                                            
126  The adoption orders were granted when the Child Care Act was in effect. In terms of 
s 233(4) of the Children's Act such counselling is now compulsory. 
127  GT v CT para [42]. 
128  GT v CT para [50]. 
129  These reasons might be grounds for an appeal. 
130  GT v CT paras [24]-[25], [30], [56]-[58], [60]. 
131  GT v CT para [32]. 
132  GT v CT paras [34], [43]. 
133  See GT v CT para [57], where the relationship between the children and their 
stepfather is couched in terms used for a divorce, namely that it had broken down 
irretrievably. 
134  Some more positives of step-parent adoption are that the step-parent might truly 
love the child; an adoption could provide the child with emotional stability; and it 
might prevent problems if the biological parent who is married to the step-parent 
dies. 
135  Sonnekus 2015 TSAR 890, 902 also discusses how step-parent adoption is often 
not in the best interests of the child.  
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that the stepfather had been "free[d] of the burden of being a father".136 
There is a danger with step-parent adoption that the interests of the child 
are overlooked. The parent and step-parent are in love at the time of the 
marriage, a fact which could be the driving force behind an adoption, but 
very often these relationships do not last, and unfortunately the step-
parent then no longer wishes to be a parent to these children, as 
happened in this matter. It is recommended that any step-parent adoption 
should be subject to intense counselling and scrutiny before it is granted. 
In fact, the best interests of the child would probably be better served if, 
instead of adoption, the step-parent was granted guardianship over the 
child. 
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